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Atomic Cournotian Traders May Be Walrasian∗
Giulio Codognato†, Sayantan Ghosal‡, Simone Tonin§
Abstract
In a bilateral oligopoly, with large traders, represented as atoms,
and small traders, represented by an atomless part, when is there a
non-empty intersection between the sets of Walras and Cournot-Nash
allocations? Using a two-commodity version of the Shapley window
model, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for a Cournot-
Nash allocation to be a Walras allocation is that all atoms demand a
null amount of one of the two commodities. We provide four examples
which show that this characterization holds non-vacuously. When our
condition fails to hold, we also confirm, through some examples, the
result obtained by Okuno et al. (1980): small traders always have a
negligible influence on prices, while the large traders keep their strate-
gic power even when their behavior turns out to be Walrasian in the
cooperative framework considered by Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971)
and Shitovitz (1973).
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72,
D51.
1 Introduction
In his celebrated paper, Aumann (1964) proved that, in exchange economies
with a continuum of traders, the core coincides with the set of Walras al-
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locations. Some years later, Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971) and Shitovitz
(1973) introduced the notion of a mixed exchange economy, i.e., an exchange
economy with large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders, rep-
resented by an atomless part, in order to analyze oligopoly in a general
equilibrium framework. Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971) showed that, if
atoms are not “too” big, the core still coincides with the set of Walras allo-
cations whereas Shitovitz (1973), in his Theorem B, proved that this result
also holds if the atoms are of the same type, i.e., have the same endowments
and preferences.
Okuno et al. (1980) considered the result obtained by Shitovitz (1973)
so counterintuitive to call into question the use of the core as the solution
concept to study oligopoly in general equilibrium.1 This led them to replace
the core with the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of a model of simultaneous,
noncooperative exchange between large traders and small traders as the ap-
propriate solution for the analysis of oligopoly in general equilibrium. The
model of noncooperative exchange they used belongs to a line of research
initiated by Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik (see Giraud (2003) for a
survey of this literature). In particular, they considered a mixed exchange
economy with two commodities which are both held by all traders. More-
over, they assumed that no trader is allowed to be both buyer and seller
of any commodity. In this framework, they showed that, if there are two
atoms of the same type who demand, at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, a pos-
itive amount of the two commodities, then the corresponding Cournot-Nash
allocation is not a Walras allocation. Therefore, under the assumptions of
Shitovitz’s Theorem B, demanding a non-null amount of the two commodi-
ties by all the atoms is a sufficient condition for a Cournot-Nash allocation
not to be a Walras allocation. This proposition allowed Okuno et al. (1980)
to conclude that the noncooperative model they considered is a useful one
to study oligopoly in a general equilibrium framework as the small traders
always have a negligible influence on prices, while the large traders keep
their strategic power even when their behavior turns out to be Walrasian in
the cooperative framework considered by Shitovitz (1973).
In this paper, we raise the question whether, in mixed exchange economies,
an equivalence, or at least a nonempty intersection, between the sets of Wal-
ras and Cournot-Nash allocations may hold. In order to further simplify
our analysis, we consider the model of bilateral oligopoly introduced by
1Okuno et al. (1980) did not quote the result obtained by Gabszewicz and Mertens
(1971). Nevertheless, their argument also holds, mutatis mutandis, for this result.
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Gabszewicz and Michel (1997) and further analyzed by Bloch and Ghosal
(1997), Bloch and Ferrer (2001), Dickson and Hartley (2008), Amir and
Bloch (2009), among others. By using this model, we still remain in a two-
commodity setting but we assume that each trader holds only one of the two
commodities whose aggregate amount is strictly positive in the economy. In
particular, we shall use a bilateral oligopoly version of the Shapley window
model. This model was first proposed informally by Lloyd S. Shapley and
further analyzed, in the case of finite economies, by Sahi and Yao (1989),
in economies with an atomless continuum of traders, by Codognato and
Ghosal (2000), and, in mixed exchange economies, by Busetto et al. (2011).
In particular, Codognato and Ghosal (2000) proved that the sets of Walras
and Cournot-Nash allocations coincide in economies with an atomless con-
tinuum of traders, thereby providing a noncooperative version of Aumann’s
theorem. Here, we first show, through some examples, that this threefold
equivalence may not hold, in the bilateral oligopoly configuration, even un-
der the assumptions made by Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971) and Shitovitz
(1973), thereby confirming the result obtained by Okuno et al. (1980). We
then answer our main question by proving a theorem which states that de-
manding a null amount of one of the two commodities by all the atoms
is a necessary and sufficient condition for a Cournot-Nash allocation to be
a Walras allocation. We also provide four examples which show that this
characterization theorem is non-vacuous. Our result depends only on atoms’
demand behavior at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. This opens the door to a
research on the conditions on the primitives of the model, i.e., traders’ size,
endowments, and preferences, under which our theorem holds. We start an
investigation in this direction by providing a necessary condition, expressed
in terms of bounds on atoms’ marginal rates of substitution, for our result to
hold when atoms’ preferences are represented by additively separable utility
functions as is the case for all the examples considered in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the math-
ematical model. In Section 3, we state the main equivalence theorems. In
Section 4, we provide some examples and we state and prove our main theo-
rem together with two propositions. In Section 5, we draw some conclusions
from our analysis.2
2In the online appendix, we prove that our main theorem can be extended, in bilateral
oligopoly, to other models of noncooperative exchange.
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2 The mathematical model
We consider a pure exchange economy with large traders, represented as
atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part. The space of
traders is denoted by the measure space (T, T , µ), where T is the set of
traders, T is the σ-algebra of all µ-measurable subsets of T , and µ is a real
valued, non-negative, countably additive measure defined on T . We assume
that (T, T , µ) is finite, i.e., µ(T ) < ∞. This implies that the measure
space (T, T , µ) contains at most countably many atoms. Let T0 denote the
atomless part of T . A null set of traders is a set of measure 0. Null sets of
traders are systematically ignored throughout the paper. Thus, a statement
asserted for “each” trader in a certain set is to be understood to hold for
all such traders except possibly for a null set of traders. A coalition is a
nonnull element of T . The word “integrable” is to be understood in the
sense of Lebesgue.
In the exchange economy, there are 2 different commodities. A com-
modity bundle is a point in R2+. An assignment (of commodity bundles
to traders) is an integrable function x: T → R2+. There is a fixed initial
assignment w, satisfying the following assumption.
Assumption 1. There is a coalition S such that w1(t) > 0, w2(t) = 0, for
each t ∈ S, and w1(t) = 0, w2(t) > 0, for each t ∈ Sc.
An allocation is an assignment x for which
∫
T x(t) dµ =
∫
T w(t) dµ.
The preferences of each trader t ∈ T are described by a utility function
ut : R
2
+ → R, satisfying the following assumptions.
Assumption 2. ut : R
2
+ → R is continuous, strongly monotone, and quasi-
concave, for each t ∈ T .
Let B(R2+) denote the Borel σ-algebra of R2+. Moreover, let T
⊗B
denote the σ-algebra generated by the sets E × F such that E ∈ T and
F ∈ B.
Assumption 3. u : T × R2+ → R, given by u(t, x) = ut(x), for each t ∈ T
and for each x ∈ R2+, is T
⊗B-measurable.
An allocation y dominates an allocation x via a coalition S if ut(y(t)) ≥
ut(x(t)), for each t ∈ S, ut(y(t)) > ut(x(t)), for a nonnull subset of traders
t in S, and
∫
S y(t) dµ =
∫
S w(t) dµ. The core is the set of all allocations
which are not dominated via any coalition.
A price vector is a nonnull vector p ∈ R2+. A Walras equilibrium is
a pair (p∗,x∗), consisting of a price vector p∗ and an allocation x∗, such
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that p∗x∗(t) = p∗w(t) and ut(x∗(t)) ≥ ut(y), for all y ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : p∗x =
p∗w(t)}, for each t ∈ T . A Walras allocation is an allocation x∗ for which
there exists a price vector p∗ such that the pair (p∗,x∗) is a Walras equilib-
rium.
We now introduce the strategic market game considering the two-com-
modity version of the reformulation of the Shapley window model proposed
by Busetto et al. (2011). A strategy correspondence is a correspondence
B : T → P(R4+) such that, for each t ∈ T , B(t) = {b ∈ R4+ :
∑2
j=1 bij ≤
wi(t), i = 1, 2}, where bij represents the amount of commodity i that trader
t offers in exchange for commodity j. A strategy selection is an integrable
function b : T → R4+, such that, for each t ∈ T , b(t) ∈ B(t). Given
a strategy selection b, we define the aggregate matrix B = (
∫
T bij(t) dµ).
Moreover, we denote by b \ b(t) the strategy selection obtained from b by
replacing b(t) with b(t) ∈ B(t) and by B \ b(t) the corresponding aggregate
matrix.
We then introduce two further definitions (see Sahi and Yao (1989)).
Definition 1. A nonnegative square matrix A is said to be irreducible if, for
every pair (i, j), with i 6= j, there is a positive integer k such that a(k)ij > 0,
where a
(k)
ij denotes the ij-th entry of the k-th power A
k of A.
Definition 2. Given a strategy selection b, a price vector p is said to be
market clearing if
p ∈ R2++,
2∑
i=1
pibij = p
j(
2∑
i=1
bji), j = 1, 2. (1)
By Lemma 1 in Sahi and Yao (1989), there is a unique, up to a scalar
multiple, price vector p satisfying (1) if and only if B is irreducible. Then,
we denote by p(b) a function which associates with each strategy selection
b the unique, up to a scalar multiple, price vector p satisfying (1), if B is
irreducible, and is equal to 0, otherwise.
Given a strategy selection b and a price vector p, consider the assignment
determined as follows:
xj(t,b(t), p) = wj(t)−
2∑
i=1
bji(t) +
2∑
i=1
bij(t)
pi
pj
, if p ∈ R2++,
xj(t,b(t), p) = wj(t), otherwise,
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j = 1, 2, for each t ∈ T .
Given a strategy selection b and the function p(b), the traders’ final
holdings are determined according to this rule and consequently expressed
by the assignment
x(t) = x(t,b(t), p(b)),
for each t ∈ T .3 It is straightforward to show that this assignment is an
allocation.
We are now able to define a notion of Cournot-Nash equilibrium for this
reformulation of the Shapley window model (see Codognato and Ghosal
(2000) and Busetto et al. (2011)).
Definition 3. A strategy selection bˆ such that Bˆ is irreducible is a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium if
ut(x(t, bˆ(t), p(bˆ))) ≥ ut(x(t, bˆ \ b(t), p(bˆ \ b(t)))),
for each b(t) ∈ B(t) and for each t ∈ T .4
A Cournot-Nash allocation is an allocation xˆ such that xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), p(bˆ)),
for each t ∈ T , where bˆ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
3 The equivalence theorems
The following theorem reminds us that, when the space of traders is atom-
less, the core coincides with the set of Walras allocations as proved by Au-
mann (1964) which, in turn, coincides with the set Cournot-Nash allocations
of the Shapley window model as shown by Codognato and Ghosal (2000).
Theorem 1 [Aumann (1964), Codognato and Ghosal (2000)]. Under As-
sumptions 1, 2, and 3, if T = T0, then the core coincides with the sets of
Walras and Cournot-Nash allocations.
Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971) and Shitovitz (1973) showed that an
equivalence between the core and the set of Walras allocations may hold
even when the space of traders contains atoms. In order to state their two
main theorems, we need to introduce some further notation and definitions.
3In order to save in notation, with some abuse, we denote by x both the function x(t)
and the function x(t,b(t), p(b)).
4Let us notice that, as this definition of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium explicitly refers
to irreducible matrices, it applies only to active Cournot-Nash equilibria (on this point,
see Sahi and Yao (1989)).
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Two traders τ, ρ ∈ T are said to be of the same type if w(τ) = w(ρ) and
uτ (·) = uρ(·). Let A = {A1, A2, . . . , Ak, . . .} be a partition of the set of
atoms T \ T0 such that Ak contains all the atoms who are of the same
type as an atom τk ∈ Ak, for each k = 1, . . . , |A|, where |A| denotes the
cardinality of the partition A. Moreover, let Tk be the set of the traders
t ∈ T who are of the same type as the atoms in Ak, for each k = 1, . . . , |A|.
Given a set Tk, denote by τhk the h-th atom belonging to the set Tk, for
each h = 1, . . . , |Ak|, where |Ak| denotes the cardinality of the set Ak. We
can now state the two theorems.
Theorem 2 [Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971)]. Under Assumptions 1, 2,
and 3, if, either |A| = 1 and∑|A1|
h=1
µ(τh1)
µ(T1)
< 1, or, |A| > 1 and ∑|A|k=1∑|Ak|h=1 µ(τhk)µ(Tk) ≤ 1, then the core
coincides with the set of Walras allocations.
Theorem 3 [Shitovitz (1973)]. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, if |A| = 1
and |A1| ≥ 2, then the core coincides with the set of Walras allocations.
Okuno et al. (1980) already showed that the equivalence stated by The-
orem 3 (Shitovitz’s Theorem B) does not extend to the set of Cournot-Nash
allocations, thereby breaking the symmetry of Theorem 1. In the next sec-
tion, we further investigate the relation between the core and the sets of
Walras and Cournot-Nash allocations.
4 Some examples, two propositions, and a theo-
rem
In the following example (Example 1 in Shitovitz (1973)), the market of
commodity 2 is monopolistic. The example shows that Theorems 2 and
3 cannot be extended to this case as |A| = 1, |A1| = 1, and µ(τ11)µ(T1) = 1.
Moreover, in this market configuration, the sets of Walras and Cournot-
Nash allocations are disjoint as there is no Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Example 1. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy
satisfying Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2}, T0 is taken with
Lebesgue measure, µ(2) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each
t ∈ T0, w(2) = (0, 4), u2(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2. Then, there is an allocation in
the core, which is not a Walras allocation, and there is no Cournot-Nash
allocation.
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Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p∗2) =
(1, 1), (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = (2, 2), for each t ∈ T0, (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) = (2, 2). As
shown by Shitovitz (1973), the allocation x˜ such that (x˜1(t), x˜2(t)) = (1, 1),
for each t ∈ T0, (x˜1(2), x˜2(2)) = (3, 3) is in the core but it is not a Wal-
ras allocation. Suppose that there is a Cournot-Nash allocation xˆ. Then,
there is a strategy selection bˆ which is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and
which is such that xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), p(bˆ)), for each t ∈ T . In particu-
lar, x(2, bˆ(2), p(bˆ)) = (bˆ12, 4 − bˆ21(2)). Let b′(2) be a strategy such that
0 < b′21(2) < bˆ21(2). Then,
u2(x(2, bˆ \ b′(2), p(bˆ \ b′(2)))) > u2(x(2, bˆ(2), p(bˆ))),
as x(2, bˆ\b′(2), p(bˆ\b′(2))) = (bˆ12, 4−b′21(2)) and u2(·) is strongly monotone,
a contradiction. Then, there is no Cournot-Nash allocation.
In the following example, all traders have the same utility function as
in Example 1 but a competitive fringe competes with the monopolist in
the market for commodity 2. The core coincides with the set of Walras
allocations as the assumptions of Theorem 2 are satisfied but no Cournot-
Nash allocation is in the core.
Example 2. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy
satisfying Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2}, T0 is taken
with Lebesgue measure, µ(2) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for
each t ∈ [0, 12 ], w(t) = (0, 4), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each t ∈ [12 , 1],
w(2) = (0, 4), u2(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2. Then, there is a unique allocation
in the core which is also the unique Walras allocation but which is not a
Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p∗2) =
(
√
3, 1), (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = ( 4√
3+1
, 12√
3+1
), for each t ∈ [0, 12 ], (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) =
( 4√
3+3
, 4
√
3√
3+1
), for each t ∈ [12 , 1], (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) = ( 4√3+3 ,
4
√
3√
3+1
). Then, by
Theorem 2, the unique Walras allocation is also the unique allocation in the
core as |A| = 1, |A1| = 1, and µ(τ11)µ(T1) < 1. Suppose that x∗ is also a Cournot-
Nash allocation. Then, there is a strategy selection b∗ which is a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium and which is such that x∗(t) = x(t,b∗(t), p(b∗)), for each
t ∈ T . But then, b∗ must be such that b∗12(t) = 4
√
3√
3+1
, for each t ∈ [0, 12 ],
b∗21(t) =
4√
3+1
, for each t ∈ [12 , 1], b∗21(2) = 4√3+1 . However, it is straight-
forward to verify that b∗(2) /∈ arg max{u2(x(t,b∗ \ b(2), p(b∗ \ b(2)))) :
8
b(2) ∈ B(2)}, a contradiction. Then, the unique Walras allocation is not a
Cournot-Nash allocation.
In the following example, all traders have the same utility function as in
Example 1 but there are two oligopolists of the same type in the market for
commodity 2. The core coincides with the set of Walras allocations as the
assumptions of Theorem 3 are satisfied but no Cournot-Nash allocation is
in the core.
Example 3. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy
satisfying Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2, 3}, T0 is taken with
Lebesgue measure, µ(2) = µ(3) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for
each t ∈ T0, w(2) = w(3) = (0, 4), u2(x) = u3(x) =
√
x1+
√
x2. Then, there
is a unique allocation in the core which is also the unique Walras allocation
but which is not a Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p∗2) =
(
√
2, 1), (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = ( 4√
2+1
, 8√
2+1
), for each t ∈ T0, (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) =
(x∗1(3),x∗2(3)) = ( 4√
2+2
, 4
√
2√
2+1
). Then, by Theorem 3, the unique Walras
allocation is also the unique allocation in the core as |A| = 1 and |A1| = 2.
Suppose that x∗ is also a Cournot-Nash allocation. Then, there is a strat-
egy selection b∗ which is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and which is such
that x∗(t) = x(t,b∗(t), p(b∗)), for each t ∈ T . But then, b∗ must be such
that b∗12(t) =
4
√
2√
2+1
, for each t ∈ T0, b∗21(2) = b∗21(3) = 4√2+1 . However,
it is straightforward to verify that b∗(2) /∈ arg max{u2(x(t,b∗ \ b(2), p(b∗ \
b(2)))) : b(2) ∈ B(2)}, a contradiction. Then, the unique Walras allocation
is not a Cournot-Nash allocation.
In Examples 2 and 3, there are atoms who demand a strictly positive
amount of both commodities at a Walras equilibrium and the sets of Walras
and Cournot-Nash allocations are disjoint. The following proposition gener-
alizes these examples providing a necessary condition for a Walras allocation
to be a Cournot-Nash allocation. In order to state the proposition, we need
a further assumption on traders’ utility functions.
Assumption 4. ut : R
2
+ → R is differentiable, for each t ∈ T \ T0.5
5In this assumption, differentiability should be implicitly understood to include the case
of infinite partial derivatives along the boundary of the consumption set (for a discussion
of this case, see, for instance, Kreps (2012), p. 58).
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Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, if the pair (p∗,x∗) is a
Walras equilibrium such that x∗(τ) 0, for an atom τ ∈ T \ T0, then x∗ is
not a Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. Suppose that the pair (p∗,x∗) is a Walras equilibrium such that
x∗(τ) 0, for an atom τ ∈ T \T0. Moreover, suppose that x∗ is a Cournot-
Nash allocation. Then, there is a strategy selection b∗ such that x∗(t) =
x(t,b∗(t), p(b∗)), for each t ∈ T , where b∗ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Since, given a trader t ∈ T , p(b∗)x∗(t) = p(b∗)w(t) and p∗ is the unique
price vector such that p∗x∗(t) = p∗w(t), p∗ = p(b∗). Consider the atom
τ ∈ T \ T0 and assume, without loss of generality, that w1(τ) = 0 and
w2(τ) > 0. At a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, for the atom τ , the marginal
rate of substitution must be equal to the marginal rate at which he can trade
off commodity 1 for commodity 2 (see Okuno et al. (1980)). Moreover, at a
Walras equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution must be equal to the
relative price of commodity 1 in terms of commodity 2. These two conditions
are expressed by the following equations:
dx2
dx1
= −p
∗1
p∗2
b∗21
b∗21 − b∗21(τ)µ(τ)
= −p
∗1
p∗2
.
Then, we must have b∗21(τ) = 0. But then, (x∗1(τ),x∗2(τ)) = (0,w2(τ)), a
contradiction. Hence, x∗ is not a Cournot-Nash allocation.
The following example differs from Example 2 only in that the monopo-
list and the competitive fringe have quasi-linear utility functions. It shows
that, under the assumptions of Theorem 2, the converse of Proposition 1
does not hold. At the unique Walras equilibrium, both the monopolist
and the competitive fringe demand a null amount of commodity 2 and this
unique Walras allocation is also the unique allocation in the core but it is
not a Cournot-Nash allocation.
Example 4. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy
satisfying Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2}, T0 is taken
with Lebesgue measure, µ(2) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for
each t ∈ [0, 12 ], w(t) = (0, 4), ut(x) =
√
x1 + 110x
2, for each t ∈ [12 , 1],
w(2) = (0, 4), u2(x) =
√
x1 + 110x
2. Then, there is a unique allocation
in the core which is also the unique Walras allocation but which is not a
Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p∗2) =
(
√
21+3
2 , 1), (x
∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = ( 8√
21+5
, 12), for each t ∈ [0, 12 ], (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) =
10
( 8√
21+3
, 0), for each t ∈ [12 , 1], (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) = ( 8√21+3 , 0). Then, by Theo-
rem 2, the unique Walras allocation is also the unique allocation in the core
as |A| = 1, |A1| = 1, and µ(τ11)µ(T1) < 1. Suppose that x∗ is also a Cournot-
Nash allocation. Then, there is a strategy selection b∗ which is a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium and which is such that x∗(t) = x(t,b∗(t), p(b∗)), for each
t ∈ T . But then, b∗ must be such that b∗12(t) = 4
√
21+12√
21+5
, for each t ∈ [0, 12 ],
b∗21(t) = 4, for each t ∈ [12 , 1], b∗12(2) = 4. However, it is straightforward to
verify that b∗(2) /∈ arg max{u2(x(t,b∗ \ b(2), p(b∗ \ b(2)))) : b(2) ∈ B(2)},
a contradiction. Then, the unique Walras allocation is not a Cournot-Nash
allocation.
The following example differs from Example 3 only in that the two
oligopolists have quasi-linear utility functions. It shows that, under the
assumptions of Theorem 3, the converse of Proposition 1 does not hold. At
the unique Walras equilibrium, the two oligopolists demand a null amount of
commodity 2 and this unique Walras allocation is also the unique allocation
in the core but it is not a Cournot-Nash allocation.
Example 5. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy
satisfying Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2, 3}, T0 is taken with
Lebesgue measure, µ(2) = µ(3) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for
each t ∈ T0, w(2) = w(3) = (0, 4), u2(x) = u3(x) =
√
x1+ 110x
2. Then, there
is a unique allocation in the core which is also the unique Walras allocation
but which is not a Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p∗2) =
(
√
3 + 1, 1), (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = ( 4√
3+2
, 8), for each t ∈ T0, (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) =
(x∗1(3),x∗2(3)) = ( 4√
3+1
, 0). Then, by Theorem 3, the unique Walras al-
location is also the unique allocation in the core as |A| = 1 and |A1| = 2.
Suppose that x∗ is also a Cournot-Nash allocation. Then, there is a strat-
egy selection b∗ which is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and which is such that
x∗(t) = x(t,b∗(t), p(b∗)), for each t ∈ T . But then, b∗ must be such that
b∗12(t) =
4
√
3+4√
3+2
, for each t ∈ T0, b∗21(2) = b∗21(3) = 4. However, it is straight-
forward to verify that b∗(2) /∈ arg max{u2(x(t,b∗ \ b(2), p(b∗ \ b(2)))) :
b(2) ∈ B(2)}, a contradiction. Then, the unique Walras allocation is not a
Cournot-Nash allocation.
We now address the question whether, in mixed exchange economies, an
equivalence, or at least a nonempty intersection, between the sets of Walras
and Cournot-Nash allocations may hold. The following example differs from
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Example 4 only for the lower “weight” of commodity 2 for traders who have
quasi-linear utility functions. At the unique Walras equilibrium, both the
monopolist and the competitive fringe demand a null amount of commodity
2 and this unique Walras allocation is also the unique allocation in the core
and the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
Example 6. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy
satisfying Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2}, T0 is taken with
Lebesgue measure, µ(2) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each
t ∈ [0, 12 ], w(t) = (0, 4), ut(x) =
√
x1+ 130x
2, for each t ∈ [12 , 1], w(2) = (0, 4),
u2(x) =
√
x1 + 130x
2. Then, there is a unique allocation in the core which is
also the unique Walras allocation and the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p∗2) =
(
√
21+3
2 , 1), (x
∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = ( 8√
21+5
, 12), for each t ∈ [0, 12 ], (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) =
( 8√
21+3
, 0), for each t ∈ [12 , 1], (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) = ( 8√21+3 , 0). Then, by The-
orem 2, the unique Walras allocation is also the unique allocation in the
core as |A| = 1, |A1| = 1, and µ(τ11)µ(T1) < 1. Moreover, the strategy se-
lection b∗, where b∗12(t) =
4
√
21+12√
21+5
, for each t ∈ [0, 12 ], b∗21(t) = 4, for
each t ∈ [12 , 1], b∗21(2) = 4, is the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium and
x∗(t) = x(t,b∗(t), p(b∗)), for each t ∈ T . Then, the unique Walras alloca-
tion is also the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
The following example differs from Example 5 only for the lower “weight”
of commodity 2 for traders who have quasi-linear utility functions. At the
unique Walras equilibrium, the two oligopolists demand a null amount of
commodity 2 and this unique Walras allocation is also the unique allocation
in the core and the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
Example 7. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy
satisfying Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2, 3}, T0 is taken with
Lebesgue measure, µ(2) = µ(3) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for
each t ∈ T0, w(2) = w(3) = (0, 4), u2(x) = u3(x) =
√
x1+ 130x
2. Then, there
is a unique allocation in the core which is also the unique Walras allocation
and the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p∗2) =
(
√
3 + 1, 1), (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = ( 4√
3+2
, 8), for each t ∈ T0, (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) =
(x∗1(3),x∗2(3)) = ( 4√
3+1
, 0). Then, by Theorem 3, the unique Walras al-
location is also the unique allocation in the core as |A| = 1 and |A1| = 2.
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Moreover, the strategy selection b∗, where b∗12(t) =
4
√
3+4√
3+2
, for each t ∈ T0,
b∗21(2) = b∗21(3) = 4, is the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium and x∗(t) =
x(t,b∗(t), p(b∗)), for each t ∈ T . Then, the unique Walras allocation is also
the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
Examples 6 and 7 differ from Examples 4 and 5 as, in the latter, all
atoms who hold commodity 2 demand a null amount of this commodity at
a Walras equilibrium but not at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium whereas, in
the former, they also demand a null amount of commodity 2 at a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium. The following theorem generalizes Examples 6 and 7 as
it shows that demanding a null amount of one of the two commodities by
all the atoms is a necessary and sufficient condition for a Cournot-Nash
allocation to be a Walras allocation.
Theorem 4. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, let bˆ be a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium and let pˆ = p(bˆ) and xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), p(bˆ)), for each t ∈ T .
Then, the pair (pˆ, xˆ) is a Walras equilibrium if and only if xˆ1(t) = 0 or
xˆ2(t) = 0, for each t ∈ T \ T0.
Proof. Let bˆ be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and let pˆ = p(bˆ) and xˆ(t) =
x(t, bˆ(t), p(bˆ)), for each t ∈ T . Suppose that the pair (pˆ, xˆ) is a Walras
equilibrium. Moreover, suppose that xˆ(τ)  0, for an atom τ ∈ T \ T0.
Then, xˆ is not a Cournot-Nash allocation, by Proposition 1, a contradiction.
Hence, xˆ1(t) = 0 or xˆ2(t) = 0, for each t ∈ T \ T0. Conversely, suppose that
xˆ1(t) = 0 or xˆ2(t) = 0, for each t ∈ T \T0. Consider an atom τ ∈ T \T0 and
assume, without loss of generality, that w1(τ) = 0 and w2(τ) > 0. Consider
the case where xˆ1(τ) = 0. Then, bˆ21(τ) = 0 and xˆ(τ) = (0,w
2(τ)). We
have that pˆxˆ(τ) = pˆw(τ) since
pˆ1xˆ1(τ) + pˆ2xˆ2(τ) = pˆ10 + pˆ2(w2(τ)− 0) = pˆ2w2(τ).
Let xˆ2(x1) be a function such that uτ (x
1, xˆ2(x1)) ≡ uτ (xˆ(τ)), for each 0 ≤
x1 ≤ w2(τ) pˆ2
pˆ1
. We have that
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x1
bˆ21 − bˆ21(τ)µ(τ)
bˆ21
pˆ2
pˆ1
− ∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x2
≤ 0
as bˆ21(τ) = 0. Then,
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x1
pˆ2
pˆ1
− ∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x2
≤ 0
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as bˆ21−0
bˆ21
= 1. But then, dxˆ
2(0)
dx1
≥ − pˆ1
pˆ2
. Consider the case where dxˆ
2(0)
dx1
=
− pˆ1
pˆ2
. Then, uτ (xˆ(τ)) ≥ uτ (y) for all y ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : pˆx = pˆw(τ)}, as uτ (·)
is quasi-concave, by Assumption 2. Consider now the case where dxˆ
2(0)
dx1
>
− pˆ1
pˆ2
. Then, dxˆ
2(x1)
dx1
> − pˆ1
pˆ2
, for each 0 ≤ x1 ≤ w2(τ) pˆ2
pˆ1
, as uτ (·) is quasi-
concave, by Assumption 2. Suppose that there exists a commodity bundle
x˜ ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : pˆx = pˆw(τ)} such that uτ (x˜) > uτ (xˆ(τ)). Then, x˜2 > xˆ2(x˜1)
as uτ (·) is strongly monotone, by Assumption 2. But then, by the Mean
Value Theorem, there exists some x¯1 such that 0 < x¯1 < x˜1 and such that
dxˆ2(x¯1)
dx1
=
xˆ2(0)− xˆ2(x˜1)
0− x˜1 < −
pˆ1
pˆ2
,
a contradiction. Therefore, uτ (xˆ(τ)) ≥ uτ (y) for all y ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : pˆx =
pˆw(τ)}. Consider now the case where xˆ2(τ) = 0. Then, bˆ21(τ) = w2(τ)
and xˆ(τ) = (w2(τ) pˆ
2
pˆ1
, 0). We have that pˆxˆ(τ) = pˆw(τ) since
pˆ1xˆ1(τ) + pˆ2xˆ2(τ) = pˆ1w2(τ)
pˆ2
pˆ1
+ pˆ2(w2(τ)−w2(τ)) = pˆ2w2(τ).
Let xˆ2(x1) be a function such that uτ (x
1, xˆ2(x1)) ≡ uτ (xˆ(τ)), for each 0 ≤
x1 ≤ w2(τ) pˆ2
pˆ1
. We have that
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x1
bˆ21 − bˆ21(τ)µ(τ)
bˆ21
pˆ2
pˆ1
− ∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x2
≥ 0
as bˆ21(τ) = w
2(τ). Then,
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x1
pˆ2
pˆ1
− ∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x2
> 0
as bˆ21−w
2(τ)µ(τ)
bˆ21
< 1. But then, dxˆ
2(x1)
dx1
< − pˆ1
pˆ2
, for each 0 ≤ x1 ≤ w2(τ) pˆ2
pˆ1
,
as uτ (·) is quasi-concave, by Assumption 2. Suppose that there exists a
commodity bundle x˜ ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : pˆx = pˆw(τ)} such that uτ (x˜) > uτ (xˆ(τ)).
Then, x˜2 > xˆ2(x˜1) as uτ (·) is strongly monotone, by Assumption 2. But
then, by the Mean Value Theorem, there exists some x¯1 such that x˜1 < x¯1 <
w2(τ) pˆ
2
pˆ1
and such that
dxˆ2(x¯1)
dx1
=
xˆ2(x˜1)− xˆ2(w2(τ) pˆ2
pˆ1
)
x˜1 −w2(τ) pˆ2
pˆ1
> − pˆ
1
pˆ2
,
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a contradiction. Therefore, uτ (xˆ(τ)) ≥ uτ (y) for all y ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : pˆx =
pˆw(τ)}. We then conclude that pˆxˆ(t) = pˆw(t) and ut(xˆ(t)) ≥ ut(y) for
all y ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : pˆx = pˆw(t)}, for each t ∈ T \ T0. Moreover, it is
straightforward to show (see, for instance, Proposition 3 in Busetto et al.
(2013)) that pˆxˆ(t) = pˆw(t) and ut(xˆ(t)) ≥ ut(y) for all y ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : pˆx =
pˆw(t)}, for each t ∈ T0. Hence, the pair (pˆ, xˆ) is a Walras equilibrium.
Examples 6 and 7 show that Theorem 4 is non-vacuous when atoms
demand, at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, a null amount of the commodity
they hold. The following two examples show that it is also non-vacuous
when atoms demand, at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, a null amount of the
commodity they do not hold.
The structure of the following example differs from that of Example 6
for a further competitive fringe which holds commodity 2 and is not of the
same type as the monopolist. At the unique Walras equilibrium, both the
monopolist and the competitive fringe with traders of the same type as the
monopolist demand a null amount of commodity 1 and this unique Walras
allocation is also the unique allocation in the core and the unique Cournot-
Nash allocation.
Example 8. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy
satisfying Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2}, T0 is taken with
Lebesgue measure, µ(2) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each
t ∈ [0, 13 ], w(t) = (0, 4), ut(x) =
√
x1+
√
x2, for each t ∈ [13 , 23 ], w(t) = (0, 4),
ut(x) =
1
4x
1 +
√
x2, for each t ∈ [23 , 1], w(2) = (0, 4), u2(x) = 14x1 +
√
x2.
Then, there is a unique allocation in the core which is also the unique Walras
allocation and the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p∗2) =
(1, 1), (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = (2, 2), for each t ∈ [0, 13 ], (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = (2, 2), for
each t ∈ [13 , 23 ], (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = (0, 4), for each t ∈ [23 , 1], (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) =
(0, 4). Then, by Theorem 2, the unique Walras allocation is also the unique
allocation in the core as |A| = 1, |A1| = 1, and µ(τ11)µ(T1) < 1. Moreover, the
strategy selection b∗, where b∗12(t) = 2, for each t ∈ [0, 13 ], b∗21(t) = 2, for
each t ∈ [13 , 23 ], b∗21(t) = 0, for each t ∈ [23 , 1], b∗21(2) = 0, is the unique
Cournot-Nash equilibrium and x∗(t) = x(t,b∗(t), p(b∗)), for each t ∈ T .
Then, the unique Walras allocation is also the unique Cournot-Nash alloca-
tion.
The structure of the following example differs from that of Example 7
for a further competitive fringe which holds commodity 2 and is not of the
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same type as the two oligopolists. At the unique Walras equilibrium, the
two oligopolists demand a null amount of commodity 1 and this unique
Walras allocation is also the unique allocation in the core and the unique
Cournot-Nash allocation.
Example 9. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy
satisfying Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2, 3}, T0 is taken
with Lebesgue measure, µ(2) = µ(3) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2,
for each t ∈ [0, 12 ], w(t) = (0, 4), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each t ∈ [12 , 1],
w(2) = w(3) = (0, 4), u2(x) = u3(x) =
1
4x
1 +
√
x2. Then, there is a unique
allocation in the core which is also the unique Walras allocation and the
unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p∗2) =
(1, 1), (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = (2, 2), for each t ∈ [0, 12 ], (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = (2, 2), for
each t ∈ [12 , 1], (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) = (x∗1(3),x∗2(3)) = (0, 4). Then, by Theo-
rem 3, the unique Walras allocation is also the unique allocation in the core
as |A| = 1 and |A1| = 2. Moreover, the strategy selection b∗, where b∗12(t) =
2, for each t ∈ [0, 12 ], b∗21(t) = 2, for each t ∈ [12 , 1], b∗21(2) = b∗21(3) = 0, is
the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium and x∗(t) = x(t,b∗(t), p(b∗)), for each
t ∈ T . Then, the unique Walras allocation is also the unique Cournot-Nash
allocation.
In all the examples of this section, preferences are represented by addi-
tively separable utility functions, i.e., utility functions of the form u(x) =
v1(x1) + v2(x2), for each x ∈ R2+. We conclude this section by providing
a necessary condition for Theorem 4 to hold when atoms’ preferences are
represented by an additively separable utility function.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, let bˆ be a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium and let xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), p(bˆ)), for each t ∈ T . Then,
for each t ∈ T \ T0 such that ut(x) = v1t (x1) + v2t (x2), xˆ1(t) = 0 only
if −∂ut(0,x2)
∂x1
/∂ut(0,x
2)
∂x2
> −∞, for each x2 ∈ R+, and xˆ2(t) = 0 only if
−∂ut(x1,0)
∂x1
/∂ut(x
1,0)
∂x2
< 0, for each x1 ∈ R+.
Proof. Let bˆ be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and let xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), p(bˆ)),
for each t ∈ T . Moreover, let pˆ = p(bˆ). Consider an atom τ ∈ T \ T0
such that uτ (x) = v
1
τ (x
1) + v2τ (x
2). Suppose that xˆ1(τ) = 0. By the same
argument used in the proof of Theorem 4, it follows that
−
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x1
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x2
≥ − pˆ
1
pˆ2
.
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Then,
−
∂uτ (0,xˆ2(τ))
∂x1
∂uτ (0,xˆ2(τ))
∂x2
> −∞.
But then, ∂uτ (0,xˆ
2(τ))
∂x1
= ∂v
1
τ (0)
∂x1
= ∂uτ (0,x
2)
∂x1
< +∞, for each x2 ∈ R+. More-
over, ∂uτ (0,x
2)
∂x2
> 0, for each x2 ∈ R+, as uτ (·) is strongly monotone, by
Assumption 2. Therefore, −∂uτ (0,x2)
∂x1
/∂uτ (0,x
2)
∂x2
> −∞, for each x2 ∈ R+.
Suppose that xˆ2(τ) = 0. By the same argument used in the proof of Theo-
rem 4, it follows that
−
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x1
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x2
< − pˆ
1
pˆ2
.
Then,
−
∂uτ (xˆ1(τ),0)
∂x1
∂uτ (xˆ1(τ),0)
∂x2
< 0.
But then, ∂uτ (xˆ
1(τ),0)
∂x2
= ∂v
2
τ (0)
∂x2
= ∂uτ (x
1,0)
∂x2
< +∞, for each x1 ∈ R+. More-
over, ∂uτ (x
1,0)
∂x1
> 0, for each x1 ∈ R+, as uτ (·) is strongly monotone, by
Assumption 2. Therefore, −∂uτ (x1,0)
∂x1
/∂uτ (x
1,0)
∂x2
< 0, for each x1 ∈ R+.
Hence, for each t ∈ T \ T0 such that ut(x) = v1t (x1) + v2t (x2), xˆ1(t) = 0
only if −∂ut(0,x2)
∂x1
/∂ut(0,x
2)
∂x2
> −∞, for each x2 ∈ R+, and xˆ2(t) = 0 only if
−∂ut(x1,0)
∂x1
/∂ut(x
1,0)
∂x2
< 0, for each x1 ∈ R+.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have reconsidered, in the framework of bilateral oligopoly,
the problem raised by Okuno et al. (1980) about the noncooperative founda-
tion of oligopolistic behavior in general equilibrium. We can now summarize
the implications of the previous analysis. The condition which requires that
the atoms are not “too” big, introduced by Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971),
is not necessary for the equivalence between the core and the set of Walras
allocations, as shown by Theorem 3, but it is sufficient for this equiva-
lence, by Theorem 2; moreover, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for a
nonempty intersection between the sets of Walras and Cournot-Nash allo-
cations as shown, respectively, by Examples 7 and 4. The condition which
requires that there are only atoms of the same type, introduced by Shitovitz
17
(1973), is not necessary for the equivalence between the core and the set
of Walras allocations, as shown by Theorem 2, but it is sufficient for this
equivalence, by Theorem 3; moreover, it is neither necessary nor sufficient
for a nonempty intersection between the sets of Walras and Cournot-Nash
allocations as shown, respectively, by Examples 6 and 5. Theorem 4 states
that the condition which characterizes the nonempty intersection of the sets
of Walras and Cournot-Nash allocations requires that each atom demands
a null amount of one commodity. Moreover, Examples 6, 7, 8, and 9 show
that this characterization condition is non-vacuous. Proposition 2 provides
a rationale for these examples by exhibiting a necessary condition, expressed
in terms of bounds on atoms’ marginal rates of substitution, for Theorem
4 to hold when atoms’ preferences are represented by additively separable
utility functions, the same class considered in the examples. We leave as
an open problem for further research the generalization of this proposition,
namely, the determination of more general assumptions on traders’ size,
endowments, and preferences under which our characterization condition
holds. This analysis could help to understand more deeply which are the
differences between atoms’ Walrasian behavior in a cooperative and in a
noncooperative framework. Some further research should also be devoted
to the possibility of generalizing the results achieved in this paper to an
exchange economy with more than two commodities.
Online Appendix
Discussion of the model
The Shapley window model (Model 1 hereafter) is one of the two models in
the literature referring to Shapley and Shubik in which markets are complete,
i.e., all commodities can be used for trade. In the other model analyzed by
Amir et al. (1990) (Model 2 hereafter), separate exchange and pricing is set
up for each pair of commodities, the price in a market being the ratio of the
total amount of bids in each of the two commodities which are exchanged
in that market. Therefore, in this model, there is one market and one price
for each pair of commodities.
In general, with more than two commodities, the sets of Cournot-Nash
allocations of the two models differ as, in Model 1, prices are determined for
each commodity whereas, in Model 2, prices are determined for each market
where pairs of commodities are exchanged and, consequently, they are not
necessarily consistent through pairs of markets in which a same commodity
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is exchanged.
Codognato (2000) started to investigate whether there might be ex-
change economies in which the sets of Cournot-Nash allocations of the two
models coincide. In particular, he proved that the two sets coincide, in ex-
change economies with an atomless continuum of traders, when prices in
Model 2 are consistent at Cournot-Nash equilibria.
Here, we address the question whether this equivalence also holds in
the mixed bilateral oligopoly framework, thereby extending to Model 2 the
results obtained for Model 1 in Section 4.
We now introduce Model 2.
Definition 4. Given a strategy selection b, the 2 × 2 matrix P is said to
be the price matrix generated by b if
pij =
{
bij
bji
if bji 6= 0,
0 if bji = 0,
i, j = 1, 2.
We denote by P (b) a function which associates with each strategy se-
lection b the price matrix P generated by b.
Given a strategy selection b and a price matrix P , consider the assign-
ment determined as follows:
xj(t,b(t), P ) = wj(t)−
2∑
i=1
bji(t) +
2∑
i=1
bij(t)pij,
j = 1, 2, for each t ∈ T .
Given a strategy selection b and the function P (b), the traders’ final
holdings are determined according to this rule and consequently expressed
by the assignment
x(t) = x(t,b(t), P (b)),
for each t ∈ T .6 It is straightforward to show that this assignment is an
allocation.
We are now able to define a notion of Cournot-Nash equilibrium for
Model 2.
6In order to save in notation, with some abuse, we denote by x both the function x(t)
and the function x(t,b(t), P (b)).
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Definition 5. A strategy selection b˜ such that B˜ is irreducible is a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium if
ut(x(t, b˜(t), P (b˜))) ≥ ut(x(t, b˜ \ b(t), P (b˜ \ b(t)))),
for each b(t) ∈ B(t) and for each t ∈ T .7
A Cournot-Nash allocation of Model 2 is an allocation x˜ such that x˜(t) =
x(t, b˜(t), P (b˜)), for each t ∈ T , where b˜ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of
Model 2.
The following lemma establishes a relation between prices and hence
traders’ final holdings of the two models for strategy selections whose ag-
gregate matrices are irreducible.
Lemma. If b is a strategy selection such that B is irreducible, then p
i(b)
pj(b)
=
pji(b), i, j = 1, 2, and x(t,b(t), p(b)) = x(t,b(t), P (b)), for each t ∈ T .
Proof. Let b be a strategy selection such that B is irreducible. Then, from
Definitions 2 and 4, we have p
i(b)
pj(b)
=
bji
bij
= pji(b), i, j = 1, 2. But then,
x(t,b(t), p(b)) = x(t,b(t), P (b)), for each t ∈ T .
The following theorem shows an equivalence between the sets of Cournot-
Nash allocations of Model 1 and Model 2.
Theorem 5. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the sets of Cournot-Nash
allocations of Model 1 and Model 2 coincide.
Proof. Let xˆ be a Cournot-Nash allocation of Model 1. Then, there is a
strategy selection bˆ which is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Model 1 and is
such that xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), p(bˆ)), for each t ∈ T . Suppose that xˆ is not a
Cournot-Nash allocation of Model 2. Then, there exists a trader τ ∈ T and
a strategy b(τ) ∈ B(τ) such that
uτ (x(τ, bˆ \ b(τ), P (bˆ \ b(τ)))) > uτ (x(τ, bˆ(τ), P (bˆ))).
x(τ, bˆ(τ), p(bˆ)) = x(τ, bˆ(τ), P (b)), by the Lemma, as Bˆ is irreducible. Sup-
pose that the matrix Bˆ\b(τ) is irreducible. Then, x(τ, bˆ\b(τ), p(bˆ\b(τ))) =
x(τ, bˆ \ b(τ), P (bˆ \ b(τ))), by the Lemma. But then,
uτ (x(τ, bˆ \ b(τ), p(bˆ \ b(τ)))) > uτ (x(τ, bˆ(τ), p(bˆ))),
7According to Amir et al. (1990), the market for commodities 1 and 2 is active if
b12 > 0 and b21 > 0 and then if and only if B˜ is irreducible. Therefore, as this definition
of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium explicitly refers to irreducible matrices, it applies only to
Cournot-Nash equilibria at which the market for commodities 1 and 2 is active.
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a contradiction. Suppose that the matrix Bˆ \ b(τ) is not irreducible. Then,
τ ∈ T \T0 as Bˆ\b(t) = Bˆ, for each t ∈ T0. Assume, without loss of generality,
that w1(τ) = 0 and w2(τ) > 0. Then, bˆ21(τ) = bˆ21 as the matrix Bˆ \ b(τ)
is not irreducible. But then, x(τ, bˆ(τ), p(bˆ)) = (bˆ12,w
2(τ) − bˆ21(τ)). Let
b′(τ) be a strategy such that 0 < b′21(τ) < bˆ21(τ). Then,
uτ (x(τ, bˆ \ b′(τ), p(bˆ \ b′(τ)))) > uτ (x(τ, bˆ(τ), p(bˆ))),
as x(τ, bˆ \ b′(τ), p(bˆ \ b′(τ))) = (bˆ12,w2(τ) − b′21(τ)) and uτ (·) is strongly
monotone, by Assumption 2, a contradiction. Therefore, xˆ is a Cournot-
Nash allocation of Model 2. Let x˜ be a Cournot-Nash allocation of Model
2. Suppose that x˜ is not a Cournot-Nash allocation of Model 1. Then, the
previous argument leads, mutatis mutandis, to the same kind of contradic-
tions. Therefore, x˜ is a Cournot-Nash allocation of Model 1. Hence, the
sets of Cournot-Nash allocations of Model 1 and Model 2 coincide.
The following corollary shows that Theorem 4 extends, mutatis mutan-
dis, to Model 2.
Corollary. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, let b˜ be a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium of Model 2 and let p˜ = (b˜21, b˜12) and x˜(t) = x(t, b˜(t), p(b˜)),
for each t ∈ T . Then, the pair (p˜, x˜) is a Walras equilibrium if and only if
x˜1(t) = 0 or x˜2(t) = 0, for each t ∈ T \ T0.
Proof. Let b˜ be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Model 2 and let p˜ =
(b˜21, b˜12) and x˜(t) = x(t, b˜(t), p(b˜)), for each t ∈ T . b˜ is a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium of Model 1, by Theorem 5, and p˜ = (b˜21, b˜12) = (p
1(b˜), p2(b˜)),
by Definition 2. Hence, by Theorem 4, the pair (p˜, x˜) is a Walras equilibrium
if and only if x˜1(t) = 0 or x˜2(t) = 0, for each t ∈ T \ T0.
Model 1 and Model 2 represent two possible generalizations of a model
proposed by Dubey and Shubik (1978) in which one commodity plays the
role of money. It is straightforward to show that, in bilateral oligopoly,
this model reduces to Model 2 once we label one of the two commodities as
money.
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